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ABSTRACT 
 
JOSHUA A. LYNN: Half-Baked Men:  
Doughface Masculinity and the Antebellum Politics of Household 
(Under the direction of Harry L. Watson) 
 
In the antebellum politics of household, political legitimacy stemmed from 
domestic life.  As white northern families and southern plantation households constituted 
distinct domesticities, northern “Doughface” Democrats betrayed the northern home by 
catering to southern planters.  Doughfaces argued that they demonstrated a manly 
independence in treating all families equally.  In reality, however, their doctrine of 
popular sovereignty unfairly benefited southern households in the federal territories in the 
late 1840s and 1850s.  Antislavery northerners responded with accusations of 
unmasculine servility.  In the 1856 presidential election, Democrats portrayed James 
Buchanan, a Doughface and a bachelor, as a man who transcended competing 
conceptions of the household.  At the same time, they offered him to southern voters as a 
fellow paternalist.  Northerners subsequently charged Buchanan with treason against the 
northern home and against the concept of household itself.  Doughfacism illustrates the 
intersection of politics, gender, and domesticity, and how political culture began at home. 
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
To Rupert Hemingway
 v
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter 
          I.      INTRODUCTION………………………………………………….…………1 
 
          II.     THE NORTHERN MEN: THE ORIGINS OF DOUGHFACISM  
 IN THE MISSOURI CRISIS……………………………………..…………14 
 
          III.    THE SOUTHERN PRINCIPLE: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND  
                   THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT………………...……………………….21 
 
          IV.   DOUGHFACES TRIUMPHANT: THE 1856 
                  BUCHANAN CAMPAIGN………………………………………………....35 
 
          V.    CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………53              
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………..57 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the spring of 1860, the American Democracy ruptured.1  The great bisectional 
party which had dominated antebellum politics for almost three decades finally buckled 
under sectional strain, splintering into northern and southern wings over the course of its 
presidential nominating conventions held in Charleston and Baltimore.  One man, at 
least, relished the opportunities which the breakdown of the last major national 
organization presented.  Like a carrion bird patiently presiding over a slow death, the 
irascible Alabama fire-eater William Lowndes Yancey gleefully superintended the entire 
process, making certain that the Democracy would not survive the presidential election of 
1860 as a united party. 
When the Democratic national convention met in Charleston in April, Yancey 
prepared to lead a walk-out of Deep South delegates if northerners did not yield to 
southern demands for federal protection of slavery in the national territories.  Yancey and 
his radical, states’ rights cohort found many seemingly moderate southerners increasingly 
wary of their erstwhile northern allies.  Northerners, on the other hand, were also newly 
reluctant to compromise with the South.  Alarmed by the rapid rise of antislavery 
                                                 
1The “American Democracy” was the common name for the Democratic party in the nineteenth century.  
The name was meant to conflate the party with democratic practices more broadly and to avoid the odium 
commonly attached to political parties.  Jean H. Baker, Affairs of Party: The Political Culture of Northern 
Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (1983; repr., New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 112-
14. 
 
 2
Republicanism and by constituents weary of catering to the Slave Power, northern 
Democrats rallied behind Illinois senator Stephen A. Douglas.  Douglas opposed federal 
protection of slavery, opting instead for Congressional non-interference with territorial 
slavery along the lines of his pet doctrine of popular sovereignty, which granted territorial 
settlers the power to decide whether to legalize slavery. 
Two inflexible factions thus faced off at Charleston.  Undoubtedly savoring the 
tense impasse as he addressed the frustrated delegates, Yancey recapitulated a hackneyed 
argument for why the North ought to yield.  He thundered, “ours is the honor at stake—
the honor of children, the honor of families, the lives, perhaps, of all—all of which rests 
upon what your course may ultimately make a great heaving volcano of passion and 
crime, if you are enabled to consummate your designs.”2  Yancey claimed that 
southerners had more at stake than northerners who were irresponsibly meddling with an 
issue that did not affect the security of their families.  When a majority of delegates 
rejected the proslavery platform, Yancey led the cotton states out of the convention.  In 
June the party lumbered back together in Baltimore for one last attempt at compromise.  
This sequel ended predictably, with another walkout and the subsequent formation of two 
rival parties which proceeded to nominate a southern Democrat and a northern Democrat 
for president—both of whom would, of course, lose to Republican Abraham Lincoln.3   
                                                 
2Speech of the Hon. William L. Yancey, Of Alabama, Delivered in the National Democratic Convention, 
Charleston, April 28th, 1860. With the Protest of the Alabama Delegation (1860), 4. 
 
3For an overview of the Charleston and Baltimore conventions, see Roy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption 
of American Democracy (1948; repr., New York: The Free Press, 1968), 288-320.   For a nuanced portrayal 
of Yancey’s central role in the conventions, see William W. Freehling, Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-
1861, vol. 2 of The Road to Disunion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 271-322. 
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Yancey had attempted a similar disruption of the Democracy twelve years earlier; 
at that time, only one delegate followed him out of the 1848 national convention.4  He 
later encouraged the South to secede rather than accept the humiliating Compromise of 
1850.  With these efforts stymied, his disunionist crusade abated until the opportunity of 
the 1860 conventions.  Yancey disingenuously explained his decade-long hiatus to the 
southern Democrats in Baltimore, “From that day to this, under all these wrongs, I have 
not urged them as a sufficient cause why the Union shall be dissolved.”5  Yancey bent the 
truth somewhat—his disunionism never hibernated.  Hardly content to remain in the 
Democracy or the Union through the 1850s, he simply found himself unable to galvanize 
his fellow southerners.   
Throughout the 1850s, secessionists such as Yancey failed to precipitate the South 
out of the Democracy as “Doughfaces”—those oft-caricatured “northern men with 
southern principles”—controlled the northern Democracy and successfully bulwarked 
southerners’ prerogatives within the party.  When Yancey argued at Charleston that the 
security of white southern families demanded northern acquiescence, he did not expect 
the newly-resolute Yankees to yield.  Gone were the tractable northerners who would 
have responded to such pleas.  Yet, throughout the 1850s plenty of northerners did 
politically foreground the needs of white southern families.  They not only responded to 
arguments such as the one Yancey made in 1860, but they made such appeals their own.   
The years of Yancey’s failed secession—1848—and of his successful one—
1860—cordon off a period which neatly parallels the Doughface ascendancy.  From 1848 
                                                 
4David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1976), 80-81. 
 
5
“Speech of the Hon. Wm. L. Yancey,” June 23, 1860, Washington, D. C. Constitution, June 27, 1860. 
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when the Doughface presidential candidate adopted the doctrine of popular sovereignty 
until 1860 when the theoretical poverty of that principle sundered the Democracy, 
Doughfaces wielded an effective formula to appease the South.  Popular sovereignty, first 
popularized by Democrats in the late 1840s and then ardently championed by Douglas in 
the 1850s, accorded territorial settlers the right to decide on the status of slavery in the 
territories.  Explaining that the doctrine denied Congress the power to regulate the 
territories, Democrats extolled popular sovereignty as the essence of democracy and local 
self-rule.  While Democrats celebrated the doctrine as impartial and democratic, they 
simultaneously stressed to southerners that popular sovereignty, by opening up the 
possibility of slavery’s expansion, favored the interests of southern families.   
Doughfacism thus represented a union of “northern men” with a doctrine touted 
as a peculiarly “southern principle.”  This winning combination kept Doughfaces in 
power through the 1850s with a Doughface in the White House eight of the twelve years 
between 1849 and 1861 and as the Democratic presidential candidate in 1848, 1852, and 
1856.6   Despite this success, Doughfacism had become an increasingly untenable 
position by the late 1850s as it became ever more apparent just how much popular 
sovereignty favored the South.  Excoriated by the North as unmasculine, treasonous 
trucklers and by the South for not being southern enough, Doughfaces lost control of the 
party, resulting in the Charleston and Baltimore debacles. 
Although ultimately unsuccessful, the role of the Doughfaces in soothing white 
southern men’s anxieties over their domestic sovereignty in the 1850s deserves attention.  
                                                 
6Millard Fillmore is often considered a Doughface.  However, in this paper I argue that Doughfacism was 
peculiarly Democratic, thus excluding those northern Whigs viewed as truckling to the South.  While the 
phenomenon of northern men catering to southern demands was hardly unique to one party, Democratic 
Doughfacism represented a distinct ideology.  
 
 5
These figures, often dismissed contemptuously by historians and contemporaries alike, 
performed an impressive feat in antebellum politics.  They straddled the sectionalized 
nature of domesticity and reinvented themselves as the guardians of white southern 
families in their effort to defuse sectional rancor and keep their party and the Union 
intact.  With these men at the helm, moderate southerners felt at ease within the 
Democracy, insulated from both the disunionist tirades of fire-eaters such as Yancey and 
the denunciations of free-soil northerners unfriendly toward slavery.   
Yet the causes of the Doughfaces’ ultimate downfall stemmed from the singular 
role they carved out for themselves.   Doughfaces found themselves susceptible to 
accusations of sectional treason from antislavery northerners.  It is easy to comprehend 
how northerners could see Doughfaces’ prosouthernism as traitorous to the free states and 
to the Union.  But this disloyalty included another dimension—Doughfaces were 
arraigned for betraying white northern families by favoring southern families.  
Doughfaces, in appealing to southern households, and antislavery northerners, in 
charging Doughfaces with betraying the northern home, expressed their understanding of 
the sectional differentiation of white antebellum families. 
 
Doughfaces highlighted these sectionally divergent domesticities as they engaged 
in the politics of household by stepping beyond the walls of the northern home to appeal 
to southern constructions of mastery.  In antebellum politics, a man’s political legitimacy 
derived from his private domestic relations.  The politically engaged were concerned with 
more than whether or not a political actor seemed manly or honorable as they also judged 
the type of household which shaped a politician’s actions.  As southern plantation 
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households and white northern households differed fundamentally in their domestic 
components, it follows that politicians saw the two types of family yielding two types of 
political leaders. 
Historians who have charted the phenomenon of divergent domesticities see it as 
a factor in the sectionalism of the Civil War era, a period in which the turbulence of 
secession and war, in the words of LeeAnn Whites, “turned the household inside out,” 
making it easier to glimpse component gender relations.  The notion of divergent 
domesticities rests on the premise that northern society broke down into a private 
domestic sphere, centered in the home, and a public sphere of economic and civic 
participation.  The southern plantation household, meanwhile, as a site of combined 
domestic and economic ventures, lacked such a distinction.  Whites finds that the rise of a 
separate domestic sphere in the North provided a space from which female abolitionists 
could attack slavery, while, by contrast, elite, white southern women sought to perpetuate 
slavery and, consequently, their own power as members of the master class.   Nina Silber 
concludes that divergent domesticities shaped how northern and southern soldiers 
experienced the Civil War.  Union men, capable of conceptualizing a nation beyond their 
family because of daily experience in the public sphere, fought for the abstract “Union.”  
Confederates, meanwhile, went to war to preserve the family structure that produced their 
economic and political power.7     
                                                 
7LeeAnn Whites, “The Civil War as a Crisis in Gender,” in Gender Matters: Civil War, Reconstruction, 
and the Making of the New South (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 11-24, quotation on 5; Nina 
Silber, Daughters of the Union: Northern Women Fight the Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 1-40; Nina Silber, Gender and the Sectional Conflict (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2008), xi-xxi, 1-36.  See also, Laura F. Edwards, Scarlett Doesn’t Live Here 
Anymore: Southern Women in the Civil War Era (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 2-4, 15-
16.  Kenneth S. Greenberg attributes the South’s distinctive political culture to the lack of separate spheres.  
Men conducted themselves the same as masters of plantations as they did as statesmen in public.  Elizabeth 
R. Varon does find the existence of separate spheres shaping the discourse surrounding white women’s 
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A second historiographical theme which helps explain how Doughfaces practiced 
the sectional politics of household is southern mastery.  The unique nature of the 
plantation household, a combination of public and private realms and economic and 
domestic pursuits, conferred a correlative sense of mastery on household heads who 
conceptualized their “family” as including white familial dependents and an enslaved 
workforce.  Mastery stemmed from more than race or gender.  As Nancy Bercaw aptly 
summarizes in her work on households in the Mississippi Delta, “neither whiteness nor 
manhood alone guaranteed a white man full rights.  […] In short, one had to meet 
standards of whiteness, manhood, and a household to be fully independent.”8  Stephanie 
McCurry has provided one of the most illuminating studies of how mastery functioned in 
the antebellum South.  In her study of yeoman households in the South Carolina Low 
Country, she concludes that yeomen embraced secession as a means to ensure their own 
mastery.  Although a vast gulf of inequality separated yeomen from planters, the two 
groups shared a common interest in perpetuating a system in which control over 
household dependents produced independence.  Mastery thus constituted a powerful 
construct in the antebellum South, conferring manhood, citizenship, and political 
                                                                                                                                                 
political participation in antebellum Virginia.  However, a tension consistently manifested itself between 
women’s domestically-inspired public role as disinterested mediators and their more conventionally 
political role as partisans.  The wartime ideal of “Confederate Womanhood” sought to collapse these two 
roles during the war.  Thus, the demarcation of the spheres was not as distinct as in the North, leading to 
distinctly southern political roles for women.  Kenneth S. Greenberg, Masters and Statesman: The Political 
Culture of American Slavery (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), vii-ix, 20; Elizabeth 
R. Varon, We Mean to Be Counted: White Women and Politics in Antebellum Virginia (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 1-2, 13-15, 80, 163-64.   
 
8Nancy Bercaw, Gendered Freedoms: Race, Rights, and the Politics of Household in the Delta, 1861-1875 
(Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 77. 
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standing.  Those who wished to make inroads in that region, such as evangelicals and, I 
argue, northern Democrats, had to cater to southern sensibilities concerning mastery.9   
Historians disagree, however, as to the precise means by which individuals 
achieved manhood in the antebellum South.  Those scholars such as McCurry who focus 
on mastery emphasize that manhood derived from the private relations of household 
dependency.  Other scholars, following the work of Bertram Wyatt-Brown, maintain that 
southerners conferred manhood, rendered as honor, through public rituals according to 
communal norms.10  This historiographical impasse has given way to what Craig 
Thompson Friend and Lorri Glover label the “honor-mastery paradigm.”11  Of the two 
concepts, mastery possesses more explanatory potential as, keyed to dominance over 
slaves, it speaks to southern distinctiveness and more effectively explains sectionalism 
and secession.   
The rigid construction of mastery, rooted in the specific physical relations of the 
household, nevertheless denies it the flexibility by which recognition of honor varied by 
community and could apply to seemingly aberrant men.  Strict criteria of mastery, such as 
slave ownership and marriage, cannot account for how men such as bachelors rose to 
                                                 
9Stephanie McCurry, Masters of Small Worlds: Yeomen Households, Gender Relations, and the Political 
Culture of the Antebellum Low Country (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).  For evangelicalism, 
see Christine Leigh Heyrman, Southern Cross: The Beginnings of the Bible Belt (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 117-60.  Heyrman shows that southern household heads 
originally distrusted evangelicals as they seemingly undermined the structure of white southern families.  
Only by bulwarking the southern familial ideal and by actually encouraging preachers to model themselves 
on secular masters did evangelicals establish themselves in the South. 
 
10Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982).  See also, Greenberg, Masters and Statesmen; and Steven M. Stowe, Intimacy and 
Power in the Old South: Ritual in the Lives of the Planters (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1987). 
 
11Craig Thompson Friend and Lorri Glover, “Rethinking Southern Masculinity: An Introduction,” in 
Southern Manhood: Perspectives on Masculinity in the Old South, eds. Craig Thompson Friend and Lorri 
Glover (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2004), vii-xvii, quotation on x.  
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political prominence in the South.  Recent work suggests ways of moving beyond the 
dichotomy of public honor and private mastery by investigating the public means by 
which men performed mastery.  Bercaw defines the concept of household itself as an 
“ideology,” in which the components of household mastery could shift to exclude certain 
groups from power.  Glover also blurs the distinction by exploring how young, elite 
southern men established their own households by means of a publicly-mediated 
“process.”12  
Examining Doughfacism lends further credence to the public and performative 
dimensions of mastery, as northern Democrats couched their pleas for southern support in 
the language of mastery, even going so far as to market northern candidates as southern 
patriarchs.  This strategy illustrates that, lacking the actual prerequisites of mastery, men 
could perform it, rhetorically construct it, and have it bestowed upon them by others 
through public acknowledgment.  Doughface rhetoric thereby offers an intriguing means 
by which to refine historical understanding of divergent domesticities and southern 
mastery, as well as to reappraise antebellum partisan politics and the disruption of the 
Democratic party more generally. 13  Doughfacism reveals how cultural constructions of 
                                                 
12Bercaw, Gendered Freedoms, 4, 67, 168-84; Lorri Glover, Southern Sons: Becoming Men in the New 
Nation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 1-3, 115-46.  Glover’s analysis, although 
conceptualizing manhood and household mastery as a process that was performed, still defines the 
components of mastery narrowly.  Bachelors, therefore, would have been excluded from mastery as 
marriage was an essential prerequisite.  See also, John Mayfield, Counterfeit Gentlemen: Manhood and 
Humor in the Old South (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2009).  Mayfield finds that 
antebellum southern humorists experimented with a myriad of definitions of manhood in response to 
economic and social changes. 
 
13Historians have posited several explanations for the disruption of the Democracy in the context of the 
1850s partisan realignment and the coming of the Civil War.  Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. argues that true 
Jacksonians left the Democracy due to that party’s increasing dedication to slavery and joined the nascent 
Republicans, while, concurrently, conservative former Whigs took over the Democratic party.  Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), 432-33, 469-93.  In 
contrast to Schlesinger’s emphasis on slavery, consensus historians of the mid-twentieth century such as 
Roy F. Nichols downplayed fundamental cleavages in politics, attributing the collapse of the Democracy to 
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gender translated into politics, how political culture originated at home, and how the 
mutable concepts of “man” and “statesman” reinforced one another and took on sectional 
meanings. 
 
Doughfaces voiced divergent domesticities and appealed to southern mastery 
primarily through campaign rhetoric.  This rhetoric reveals that Democrats shared a 
national political message rooted in the ideology of “Democratic conservatism,” of which 
popular sovereignty formed the core.  This conservative ideology functioned to define 
Democrats in response to the tumultuous 1850s partisan realignment.  The second 
American party system which had matched Whigs against Democrats through much of 
the antebellum period collapsed in the 1850s.  The concurrent rise of the antislavery 
Republicans after 1854 as the Democrats’ new competitors led to the institutionalization 
of a new party system.  The evanescent American or “Know-Nothing” party, a nativist 
and anti-Catholic organization, also made a failed bid for longevity on the national 
political stage in the middle of the decade.14  
                                                                                                                                                 
divisive sectional politicians outmaneuvering conservative Unionists.  Nichols, The Disruption of American 
Democracy, 7-9, 33-53, 318-20, 502-6.  Beginning in the 1960s, as American historians more generally 
recognized slavery as a fundamental division in antebellum society, several scholars have attributed 
Democratic divisions to slavery.  Eric Foner, in an updated form of Schlesinger’s thesis, argues that 
ideological opposition to slavery and southern power drove many northern Democrats into the Republican 
party.  Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil 
War (1970; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 149-85.  Michael F. Holt challenges the 
historiographical trend prioritizing slavery, arguing that the second party system collapsed due to systemic 
weaknesses after Democrats and Whigs no longer differed on slavery and economic issues, thereby failing 
to offer voters distinct choices.  Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (1978; repr., New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1983). 
 
14Michael F. Holt argues that many historians unfairly dismiss the Know-Nothings as a viable contender for 
a permanent place in a new party system after the disintegration of the Whigs.  Although the Know-
Nothings’ inability to speak to the issue of slavery doomed their ability to solidify their status during a 
period of partisan flux driven by disputes over slavery, Holt’s argument is instructive when considering 
Democratic anxiety over the emergence of this party.  Democrats certainly did not dismiss the Know-
Nothing threat.   Michael F. Holt, “Another Look at the Election of 1856,” in James Buchanan and the 
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During this transitional period, Democrats often treated their diverse competitors 
as a common “fanatical” enemy, against which they juxtaposed their shared 
conservatism.  At the same time, Democrats tailored their national message to suit local 
and sectional sensibilities.  Popular sovereignty comprised the elastic core of Democratic 
conservatism and allowed Democrats to target certain constituencies by arguing either 
that popular sovereignty benefited northern and southern families equally in allowing 
both to spread to the territories or that it especially privileged the plantation household.  
As such, the household represented an additional audience which Democrats addressed.  
Taking a cue from studies of material culture, Mark E. Neely, Jr. finds that partisan print 
culture occupied a privileged place in homes as signifiers of bourgeois respectability.  
Neely, as such, has recently called for political historians to consider how national 
politics unfolded within the home.15   
Political leaders themselves were fully aware of the reach of their rhetoric and of 
its consumption within the home.  Democrats campaigned in the Capitol, anticipating that 
their remarks would reach a large readership through the Congressional Globe, the 
serialized record of Congress.16  Stump speeches from throughout the nation, moreover, 
reappeared as pamphlets or in newspapers published by Democratic presses, with 
congressmen using franking privileges to subsidize mailing.17  Democrats banked on this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Political Crisis of the 1850s, ed. Michael J. Birkner (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 
1996), 37-42. 
 
15Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Boundaries of American Political Culture in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 1-29. 
 
16Roy F. Nichols and Philip S. Klein, “Election of 1856,” in History of American Presidential Elections, 
1789-1968, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), 1027; Eugene H. 
Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), 164. 
 
17Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, 55-56.  
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massive circulation reaching householders.  Judah P. Benjamin, for example, admonished 
a Senate colleague that his reckless misstatement “will be spread through the machinery 
of the Federal post office.  It is printed in your Globe.  It will be read probably by 
millions of people” as it spread to “every village, to every hamlet, to every cottage.”18   
 Through this campaign literature, Doughfaces spoke to men far removed from 
themselves in both space and worldview—the masters of southern plantations.  
Doughfaces specifically attempted to convince these men that northern Democrats could 
defend their domestic prerogatives.  Doughfaces first appeared in national politics during 
the Missouri Crisis when antislavery northerners developed the concept of Doughfacism 
to castigate seemingly prosouthern northerners with the stigma of unrepublican 
dependence, unmasculine servility, and treason.  These weak and unmanly northern men 
fought to overcome these negative connotations when they found their southern 
principle—popular sovereignty—in the late 1840s.  To northern audiences Doughfaces 
stressed that this doctrine impartially oversaw competition between antislavery and 
plantation households in the territories.  To southern masters, however, they confided that 
popular sovereignty prioritized southern domesticity.   
The conjunction of the northern men with this southern principle reached its 
mature form in the presidential election of 1856.  Democrats appealed to southern 
planters by arguing that their candidate, James Buchanan, sympathized with southern 
families and actually adhered to southern tenets of mastery himself.  Similar to the 
                                                 
18Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., 1st sess., 1855-56, pt. 2:1094.  Benjamin was addressing Republican 
William Henry Seward.  Roy F. Nichols and Michael F. Holt both caution against viewing antebellum 
parties as national organizations beyond the state level.  Despite the decentralized organization of the 
antebellum Democracy and state parties’ need to cater to local electorates, print culture produced for 
national consumption proves that Democrats shared a common ideology, if not a national structure. 
Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, 20-21; Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s, ix, 14-16. 
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platform including popular sovereignty on which he stood, Democrats presented 
Buchanan to the North as an equal arbitrator of northern and southern families, but to the 
South as a stalwart proponent of the plantation household.  This duality did not escape 
antislavery voters, who since 1820 had consistently charged Doughfaces with treason 
against the northern home.  In transgressing sectional norms of domesticity by trying to 
appease southern masters, Doughfaces betrayed northern families, exacerbated sectional 
tensions, and ultimately enervated the bisectional party they sought to hold together.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE NORTHERN MEN: THE ORIGINS OF DOUGHFACISM IN THE MISSOURI 
CRISIS 
 
 
 
From all dough-faced, half-baked, and slack-baked representatives; Good Lord, 
deliver us. 
—New Haven, Connecticut Journal, June 20, 1820 
In the debates over the statehood of Missouri territory, Representative John 
Randolph of Roanoke coined the epithet “dough face” when he lambasted those northern 
congressmen who actually facilitated his and other southerners’ desire for an additional 
slave state.  In March 1820, enough northern representatives voted with the South to 
permit Missouri’s entrance into the Union with slavery.  Despite this assistance, 
Randolph viciously declared: 
I knew these would give way.—They were scared at their own dough faces—yes, 
they were scared at their own dough faces!  We had them, and if we had wanted 
three more, we could have had them; yes, and if these had failed, we could have 
had three more of these men, whose conscience and morality and religion extend 
to thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude.  You can never find any 
difficulty in obtaining the support of men whose principles of morality and 
religion are bounded by thirty six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude!19 
 
As Congress did not at this time keep a full record of its debates, ambiguity immediately 
surrounded Randolph’s pronouncement, and, as historian Leonard L. Richards accurately 
                                                 
19Springfield (MA) Hampden Federalist and Public Journal, April 12, 1820.  With “thirty six degrees and 
thirty minutes north latitude,” Randolph was referring to one of the components of the Missouri 
Compromise finalized in March 1820.  In return for Missouri’s entrance as a slave state, Maine would join 
the Union as a free state.  In addition, all subsequent states carved out of the territory of the Louisiana 
Purchase above 36°30´ north latitude (the southern boundary of Missouri) would be free states.  For an 
overview of the Missouri Crisis, see Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005), 222-37. 
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put it, “no one dared to ask for an explanation” from the unstable and violent Virginian.20  
Randolph, who underscored his temper with the accompaniment of high-pitched tirades, 
often paraded booted and spurred, armed with riding crop and flanked by dogs, about the 
floor of the House.  Members were wisely cautious with his touchy sense of honor.   
Newspapers—mostly in the North—therefore engaged in a national debate to 
ascertain whether Randolph said “doe” or “dough” and to determine what he could 
possibly have meant with either homophone.  Despite the uncertainty, some constant 
themes ran through the discussion, establishing negative and gendered connotations of 
“dough face” which would endure through the 1850s.  Contemporaries indicted 
Doughfaces for violating norms of masculinity and of republicanism; moreover, they 
accused them of treason against the northern household.  
 
Whether rendered as “doe face” or “dough face,” the expression implicated the 
designee’s manhood.21  These men were cowards, frightened into doing the bidding of 
the South.  Comparing these northerners to skittish female deer, commentators remarked 
that their performance was “emblematical of timidity.”22  When derided as “dough” 
faces, the defectors’ “pallid hue of unbaked pastry” stood in contrast with the “healthful 
                                                 
20Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 86. 
 
21For a contemporary overview of the various meanings assigned to the term, see, New Haven, Connecticut 
Journal, June 20, 1820; and Boston Daily Advertiser, June 22, 1820.  For the etymology of “doughface,” 
see Hans Sperber and James N. Tidwell, “Words and Phrases in American Politics,” American Speech 25, 
no. 2 (May 1950): 91-100. 
 
22Hudson (NY) Northern Whig, May 2, 1820; Windsor, Vermont Journal, June 12, 1820; Boston Daily 
Advertiser, June 22, 1820.  Quotation from Windsor, Vermont Journal. 
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brown” of the finished product.23  Another explanation for the term originated in a 
children’s game in which girls and boys smeared their faces with dough and wrapped 
their bodies in sheets to frighten their playmates.24  Just as these children could become 
startled at their own spectral physiognomy staring back at them from the mirror, northern 
representatives showed they were “alarmed at the creatures of their own imaginary 
formation” and “frightened at their own shadows,” thereby resembling “craven spirits 
who cowed before the storm.”25  When faced with southern cries of disunion should the 
South not get its way, these northerners buckled under such ominous threats.  These men 
seemed duplicitous and weak, unmasculine and useless.26 
Connotations of Doughface, in addition to impugning one’s manhood, also 
challenged politicians’ adherence to the tenets of virtuous and independent statesmanship 
enshrined in the republican ideology—the set of political beliefs which guided the 
American Revolution and remained the bedrock of the nation’s political culture in the 
antebellum period.  Republicans sought above all to preserve their political 
independence, lest they become slaves to others’ ambitions.  The independent statesman 
ought to be suspicious of power, as concentrations of it could enable conspiracies to 
undermine liberty and enslave the people.27  The ideal “statesman” at the heart of 
republicanism intersected with the ideal “man” at the core of antebellum gender 
                                                 
23Boston Daily Advertiser, June 22, 1820. 
 
24Ibid.; New Haven, Connecticut Journal, June 20, 1820. 
 
25Quotations from, respectively, New Haven, Connecticut Journal, June 20, 1820; City of Washington 
(District of Columbia) Gazette, December 14, 1820; and Hudson (NY) Northern Whig, May 2, 1820.  
 
26New Haven, Connecticut Journal, June 20, 1820. 
 
27For a brief overview of the tenets of the republican ideology, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins 
of the American Revolution, 1967, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 55-93. 
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constructions.  Viewing political culture from this intersection, the ideal of political 
masculinity crystallizes.  One could not be a statesman without first proving oneself a 
man.  Thus, cowardice as a man resulted in servility in politics.  If one was timid as a 
deer in personal life, so too in public life, permitting enslavement by more courageous 
men—in this case, by imperious southerners.   
By disregarding the antislavery beliefs that many critics felt they ought to have 
espoused as representatives of the free North, Doughfaces subordinated principle to 
policy and became the “servile” tools of others.28  In light of this course, the “anti-
republican”29 meaning of Doughface becomes clear—those who abandoned morality and 
principle, those who could be “moulded into any shape.”30  One northern newspaper 
labeled them “slave-voter[s].”31  This strong appellation can be read in two ways—as 
referring to those who voted to broaden the demesne of slavery by admitting Missouri 
and who, in the process, became slaves themselves by conceding to slaveholders.  Indeed, 
as Randolph’s diatribe suggests, some southerners held their northern allies in contempt 
for abandoning their independence—southerners “love the treason, but hate the 
traitor.”32  Southern slaveholders chastised their northern accomplices with “the lash of 
satire,” much as they would physically whip slaves who, for their lack of cherished 
                                                 
28Vermont Intelligencer and Bellows’ Falls Advertiser, May 1, 1820. 
 
29Keene, New-Hampshire Sentinel, June 3, 1820.  During the so-called “Era of Good Feelings,”  most 
political disagreement was maintained within a single party—the Democratic-Republicans.  “Republican,” 
therefore, could signify both the abstract notion of republicanism or the tenets of the party.  However, this 
distinction is not at all clear, as Republicans heralded their party as the only true adherent to republicanism, 
thus conflating “Republican” and “republican.”  
 
30Carlisle (PA) Republican, October 6, 1820.  See also, Boston Daily Advertiser, June 22, 1820; and 
Palmyra (NY) Register, December 6, 1820. 
 
31Providence (RI) Gazette, August 14, 1820. 
 
32Providence, Rhode-Island American, and General Advertiser, March 17, 1820.  See also, Hudson (NY) 
Northern Whig, May 2, 1820.  
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autonomy, they could not but hold in contempt.33  In the antebellum South, the complete 
abnegation of liberty represented by slavery functioned negatively to define men.  White 
southerners did not see male slaves as men, dependent as they were upon a master’s 
will.34  So strong were these political norms that, even though Doughfaces gave the South 
crucial votes, southerners could not recognize them as men due to their violation of 
republican dictates.  Slavery and manhood were mutually exclusive in antebellum 
political culture.   
 
In flouting republican maxims by surrendering the moral position of the North, 
Doughfaces not only emasculated and enslaved themselves, but also risked enslaving all 
white northerners.  One of the most serious charges aimed at Doughfaces that persisted 
into the 1850s was that of treason.  Antislavery northerners indicted Doughfaces for 
treason in domestic terms—by denouncing them for betraying northern households.  In 
leveling this accusation, northern critics voiced their recognition of the differences 
between white domestic life in the North and in the South.  In the process, they also 
demonstrated how the politics of household functioned by communicating their belief 
that these differences at home gave rise to disparities in how men conducted themselves 
in public.   
Northerners disappointed with Doughfaces lamented how even New Englanders, 
who especially ought to have known better, aided the spread of southern domestic values.  
Just as Doughface treachery ensured that slavery would advance geographically, so too 
                                                 
33Vermont Intelligencer and Bellows’ Falls Advertiser, May 1, 1820. 
 
34Greenberg, Masters and Statesmen, vii-xi. 
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would southern domesticity spread culturally.  Disloyal northerners permitted southerners 
rooted in an alien domestic world, where they grew up “nursed in the lap of slavery,” to 
overtake the North.  One editor made the linkage between the household and politics 
explicit by arguing that southern homes yielded distinct political behavior.  Describing 
southern children exposed to slavery, he observed, “They are born little sovereigns.”  
With this upbringing, it was no surprise that southern men “should strive for dominion in 
public life; and manifest in the councils of the Union the same dispositions, which they 
have been in the habit of indulging in domestic circles.”  Doughfaces, yielding to the 
dictates of southerners accustomed to unconditional obedience, consequently enabled 
southern “domestic despotism” to translate into political tyranny.35   
In their initial reaction to Doughfacism in 1820, antislavery northerners traced a 
flimsy demarcation between public and private, political and domestic spheres in the 
South.  Slaveowners could easily extend the mastery they exercised over their white 
dependents and slaves to dominate northerners as well.  Such unadulterated power rang 
alarms for sturdy republicans.  Just as the Missouri Compromise allowed actual 
plantation households to spread across space, so too could southern conceptions of 
mastery gain wider currency.  The equivalence between southern domestic and political 
dominance was anathema to northern men, who valued the home as a refuge from 
politics, not as the source of political power.  Southern ideas of mastery could ultimately 
poison this sanctified private sphere.  Those northerners who facilitated this dismal future 
could be considered nothing less than traitors to the embattled northern household. 
                                                 
35Vermont Intelligencer and Bellows’ Falls Advertiser, May 1, 1820.  See also, Amherst (NH) Hillsboro’ 
Telegraph, March 18, 1820; Keene, New-Hampshire Sentinel, April 1, 1820; Boston Columbian Centinel, 
July 19, 1820; and Providence (RI) Gazette, August 14, 1820. 
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Thomas Jefferson famously called the debates over Missouri a “fire bell in the 
night,” knelling the dissolution of the Union.36  Out of those heated debates, many 
Americans heralded an enduring compromise.  But another legacy emerged from the 
conflagration, one uncooked by the flames—the Doughfaces.  Whether through their 
duplicitous voting or by actually withdrawing from the House chamber to permit 
southerners to carry the issue,37 these men had stayed on the margins—they were “set too 
near the mouth of the oven.”38   The Missouri Compromise, forged directly in the fire, on 
the other hand, was celebrated for its “finality” and would become sacrosanct in 
American political culture.39  Ironically, it would be those unfinished goods who would 
outlast the supposedly more thoroughly baked Compromise and would actually engineer 
its repeal when, reaching the height of their power in the 1850s, the Doughfaces cooked 
up a new concoction—the doctrine of popular sovereignty.  A commentator in 1820 
hoped that in the future “none but men of manly minds” would return to Congress.40  
Much to opponents’ chagrin, the unpalatable half-baked men would remain a constant in 
American politics until the Civil War. 
                                                 
36Jefferson quoted in Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, 236.  Lacy K. Ford notes that fire bells 
rang with a distinctly southern accent as signals of slave uprisings.  Doughfaces promised to quiet such 
nocturnal alarms by preventing fellow northerners from agitating the issue of slavery, thus avoiding future 
Missouri Crises and the servile insurrections they could produce.  Lacy K. Ford, Deliver Us from Evil: The 
Slavery Question in the Old South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 66-67. 
 
37One defender of several northerners who voted with the South argued that Randolph’s “dough face” 
epithet referred to those northerners who actually left the House chamber to avoid the vote.  Those who had 
remained to vote with the South, for “the good of their country,” acted respectably.  Newark (NJ) Centinel 
of Freedom, May 23, 1820. 
 
38Boston Daily Advertiser, June 22, 1820.  
 
39James Buchanan, for example, who would later support the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, which explicitly 
repealed the Missouri restriction, originally praised the finality of the Compromise.  James Buchanan, 
“Remarks, April 2 and 4, 1836, On the Admission of Arkansas into the Union,” in The Works of James 
Buchanan: Comprising His Speeches, State Papers, and Private Correspondence, ed. John Bassett Moore 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1908-1911), 3:51. 
 
40Hudson (NY) Northern Whig, May 2, 1820. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE SOUTHERN PRINCIPLE: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE KANSAS-
NEBRASKA ACT 
 
 
 
John Randolph sneeringly said—“if we had needed more of them, we should have 
had them, Sir.”  And was he not right? and has not the South now, and before 
now, got “more of them”? […] Freemen of the North, of whatever party, shall we 
follow such men? 
—A Bake Pan. For the Dough-Faces, 1854 
With the term itself coined as early as 1820, the concept of Doughfacism 
underwent further refinement during the antebellum period, reaching its mature 
formulation by the mid-1850s.  In the late 1840s, Democrats added the essential 
ingredient—the doctrine of popular sovereignty.  This principle, unique to the 
Democracy, ensured that the concept of Doughfacism which took shape after 1848 
constituted a distinctly Democratic ideology.  While the Whig party and, later, the Know-
Nothing party would count among their numbers northern men obsequious to the South, 
the combination of pliant northerners with a principle that facilitated the expansion of 
plantation households marked Doughfacism as a coherent ideology and lodged it squarely 
within the party’s broader worldview of Democratic conservatism. 
 Although Americans nationwide had lionized the Missouri Compromise as the 
definitive settlement of the issue of territorial slavery, the acquisition of additional 
territory wrenched from a subjugated Mexico in 1848 raised anew the question of 
slavery’s future in the Union.  Party warhorse Lewis Cass of Michigan first popularized 
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the idea of popular sovereignty in a public letter announcing his candidacy for the 1848 
Democratic presidential nomination.41  With this solution, Cass hoped to remove the 
contentious issue of slavery from national politics by granting territorial settlers, not 
Congress, the exclusive right to decide on slavery.  Cass explained his rationale: “Leave 
to the people who will be affected by this question, to adjust it upon their own 
responsibility, and in their own manner, and we shall render another tribute to the original 
principles of our government, and furnish another guarantee for its permanence and 
prosperity.”42  Cass subsequently received the nomination, but lost the election.  
Congress did selectively incorporate popular sovereignty into the Compromise of 1850, 
allowing some territories to decide on the legality of slavery.43  The doctrine reemerged 
as a divisive test of party loyalty when Illinois senator Stephen A. Douglas used it to 
frame the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.  This legislation organized the territories of 
Nebraska and Kansas under the parameters of popular sovereignty, thereby reopening 
portions of the Louisiana Purchase to slavery.  Many northerners recoiled in horror at the 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the prospect of slavery spreading to previously 
                                                 
41Cass’s idea was not the only Democratic answer to the territorial question.  James Buchanan, also 
announcing his candidacy in a public letter, proposed the extension of the Missouri line of 36°30´ north 
latitude across the new territories.  His initial position is significant in light of the fact that he later ran on a 
popular sovereignty platform in 1856.  Democrats, both North and South, went to great lengths to assure 
voters that, despite his early idea, he had emphatically converted to popular sovereignty.  James Buchanan 
to Charles Kessler et al., Washington, D. C., August 25, 1847, in The Works of James Buchanan, 7:385-87. 
This letter is known as Buchanan’s “Harvest Home” letter.  See also, Potter, The Impending Crisis, 56-58, 
69-76.  
 
42Cass to A. O. P. Nicholson, Washington, D. C., December 24, 1847, in Letter from Hon. Lewis Cass, of 
Michigan, On The War and the Wilmot Proviso (Washington, D. C.: Blair and Rives, 1847), 7. 
 
43Potter, The Impending Crisis, 115-16.  New Mexico and Utah territories were organized according to 
popular sovereignty.  
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free areas.  The fact that a substantial number of northern Democrats voted for the 
legislation only compounded their disgust.44   
While Democrats originally seized on popular sovereignty as a means to deflate 
divisions over territorial slavery, the doctrine served an additional purpose—it allowed 
Doughfaces to rebut the negative gendered connotations attached to them during the 
Missouri Crisis and to posture as the defenders of white families in the North and in the 
South.  As in 1820, politicians in the 1850s rendered political differences in terms of 
antagonistic conceptions of the household.  Virginian Muscoe R. H. Garnett, writing in 
1850, for instance, showed that the cult of domesticity and its accompanying ideology of 
separate spheres did not constitute a national phenomenon.  He attacked northerners 
because “they divide the household into separate interests” coded by gender, thereby 
undermining organic domestic hierarchies with false notions of equality.  The result was 
not only sexual profligacy but the inadequacy of northern leaders in comparison to “the 
superiority of Southern statesmen” who benefited from “the management of the little 
commonwealth of the plantation [which] is an excellent training for the administration of 
a larger State.”45   
In 1854 a northern pamphleteer, attempting to “bake” Doughfaces out of their 
complacent prosouthernism regarding the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
responded directly to Garnett’s charges by attacking southern families.  He defined the 
                                                 
44In the 1854 Congressional elections, sixty-six of ninety-one Democrats representing free states lost their 
seats—punishment for the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Potter, The Impending Crisis, 175.  For an overview of 
popular sovereignty and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, see Willard Carl Klunder, “Lewis Cass, Stephen 
Douglas, and Popular Sovereignty: The Demise of the Democratic Party,” in Politics and Culture of the 
Civil War Era: Essays in Honor of Robert W. Johannsen, eds. Daniel McDonough and Kenneth W. Noe 
(Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehana University Press, 2006), 129-53. 
 
45[Muscoe R. H. Garnett], The Union, Past and Future: How it Works, and How to Save It. By a Citizen of 
Virginia, 3rd ed. (Washington: John T. Towers, 1850), 25-29, quotations on 25 and 28. 
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southern home as “a household including slaves—their families are a unit.”  Lacking 
“separate interests,” there were no barriers to miscegenation, with the outcome that 
planters “sell the members of the ‘domestic hearth’ (as they sometimes condescendingly 
call them) not excepting their own children!!”  The author urged Doughfaces to cease 
serving as “pimps and peddlers” to such licentiousness.46  These two pamphlets illustrate 
that politicians continued to practice the politics of household by distinguishing between 
white northern and southern families and by maintaining that these distinct domesticities 
yielded different types of politicians.  Doughfaces in the late 1840s and 1850s, therefore, 
by brandishing a doctrine that they claimed amounted to a manly defense of the 
prerogatives of northern and southern household heads, exposed themselves once again to 
charges of unmasculine treason against the northern home due to the latent prosouthern 
bias of popular sovereignty.    
 
Democrats touted popular sovereignty as an inherently masculine doctrine that 
stood in stark contrast to the “puling sentimentality”47 of moral zealots such as 
abolitionists.  As such, popular sovereignty merged with the larger ideology of 
Democratic conservatism, which held that Democrats ought to be amoral referees 
standing aloof from efforts to implement normative visions of society.  Democratic 
conservatism congealed in reaction to the partisan upheaval of the 1850s.  During this 
period of flux, Democrats witnessed the coalescence of parties which they feared would 
                                                 
46[Leonard Marsh], A Bake-Pan. For the Dough-Faces. By One of Them (Burlington, VT: C. Goodrich, 
1854), 10-11, 17, 25, 35, 47, 64, quotations on 11. 
 
47Lewis Cass, “Nebraska and Kansas. Speech of Hon. Lewis Cass, of Michigan, In the Senate, February 20, 
1854,” Congressional Globe, 33rd Cong., 1st sess., 1853-54, appendix:276.   
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impose exclusionary conceptions of the good society through the mechanisms of the 
federal government.  Democrats subsequently melded the antislavery views of 
Republicans and abolitionists, the anti-Catholicism and nativism of Know-Nothings, and 
the enforced prohibition sought by a politicized temperance movement into a monolithic 
enemy labeled “fanaticism.”  This foe, they warned, would trespass upon not only 
individual self-determination, but also against the sacrosanct boundaries of the 
household. 
With the term “fanaticism,” Democrats singled out what they saw as the 
inappropriate imposition of normative morality by governmental means, in opposition to 
which they championed their “conservative” tolerance for diversity.  New York’s Horatio 
Seymour posited that the “meddling theory of government,” which “claims the exclusive 
championship of morals, religion and liberty,” served as the “common sentiment” 
animating fanatics.48  Illinois congressman Samuel S. Marshall, in a remarkable address 
tellingly entitled, “Insanity of the Times,” explicitly grounded Republican and Know-
Nothing fanaticism in a contemporary mindset where “there is no folly so great, no 
theory in religion, morals, or politics, so wild and visionary, that it will not find numerous 
and zealous advocates among our people.”49  Democrats situated their conservatism in a 
larger indictment of political orientations stemming from “false theories, ancient dogmas, 
and miserable fallacies,”50 “wild and crazy theories,” and dangerous “isms.”51  
                                                 
48Speech of the Hon. Horatio Seymour at Springfield, Mass., July 4, 1856 (Buffalo, NY: 1856), 3. 
 
49Samuel S. Marshall, “Insanity of the Times—Present Condition of Political Parties. Speech of Hon. S. S. 
Marshall, of Illinois, In the House of Representatives, August 6, 1856,” Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., 
1st sess., 1855-56, appendix:1226. 
 
50David Barclay, “National Politics. Speech of Hon. David Barclay, of Pennsylvania, In the House of 
Representatives, August 6, 1856,” Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., 1st sess., 1855-56, appendix:1088. 
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Characterizing their political struggles in terms of a war against fanatical impulses more 
broadly, as opposed to discrete political parties, Democrats also took the time to 
denounce “free-love societies,”52 “agrarianism,” “higher-lawism,”53 “Maine Law-ism, 
Woman’s Rights-ism, and every other ism that can be conceived of.”54   
The fusion of all these moral impulses into one “medley of united fanaticisms” 
provided a rhetorical plane on which Democrats north and south could cooperate.55  
Popular sovereignty thus granted the Democracy incredible flexibility, as state and local 
politicians, whether protesting temperance in Delaware, railing against nativism in 
Massachusetts, or defending slaveholding as the basis of legislative apportionment in 
North Carolina, could denounce their enemies as fanatics who impinged upon another’s 
autonomy.56  At the same time, Democrats deployed the ideology pragmatically in order 
                                                                                                                                                 
51Marshall, “Insanity of the Times,” 1227.  Dickson D. Bruce, Jr. notes that antebellum conservatives in 
Virginia shared in a wider conservative tradition, dating back to Edmund Burke, of denouncing reform 
efforts and political orientations rooted in abstract theory, as opposed to experience.  Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., 
The Rhetoric of Conservatism: The Virginia Convention of 1829-30 and the Conservative Tradition in the 
South (San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library, 1982), xvi, 84-89, 164-69. 
 
52Marshall, “Insanity of the Times,” 1227. 
 
53James A. Stewart, “The Slavery Question. Speech of Hon. James A. Stewart, of Maryland, In the House 
of Representatives, July 23, 1856,” Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., 1st sess., 1855-56, appendix:992.  
 
54Daniel S. Dickinson, “Speech on the Maine Law Question. Delivered at a Democratic Ratification 
Meeting, Held at the Broadway Tabernacle, New York, November 1, 1854,” in Speeches, Correspondence, 
Etc., of the Late Daniel S. Dickinson, of New York. Including: Addresses on Important Public Topics; 
Speeches in the State and United States Senate, and in Support of the Government during the Rebellion; 
Correspondence, Private and Political (Collected and Arranged by Mrs. Dickinson), Poems (Collected and 
Arranged by Mrs. Mygatt), Etc., ed. John R. Dickinson (New York: G. P. Putnam and Son, 1867), 1:506.  
“Maine Law-ism” referred to Maine’s temperance law which was simultaneously lauded and feared as a 
prototype for other states. 
 
55Marshall, “Insanity of the Times,” 1227.  See also, “The Union—The Democratic Party—The 
Administration,” The United States Democratic Review, June 1856, 435-46.  Dickson D. Bruce, Jr. 
similarly argues that antebellum southern conservatism entailed more than a defense of slavery. Bruce, The 
Rhetoric of Conservatism, xi, 92, 175-76. 
 
56Dover, Delaware State Reporter, February 15 and 19, 1856; A Speech Delivered at Webster, Mass., 
Providence, R. I., Nashua, N. H., and Other Places, during the Presidential Campaign of 1856, in Support 
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to avoid the same charges of theoretical zealotry for which they denounced fanatics.  
They often resisted following popular sovereignty to its logical, and unpopular, 
conclusions.  Polygamy in Utah, for example, despite its sanction by the territorial 
government, did not receive Democratic approval as an expression of popular 
sovereignty.57  Democratic conservatism, as such, hardly constituted a consistent 
ideology; rather, it was a remarkably effective way to gloss over political divisions within 
a party that, unlike all others in the 1850s, managed to retain a diverse, national 
constituency.  In fact, Democrats would have countered, the tendency to eschew 
ideological consistency itself signified masculine pragmatism. 
 The difference between conservatism and fanaticism thus took on gendered 
meanings, as Democrats contended that it was a sign of masculine independence to 
decide one’s own moral code, as opposed to feminine submission to moral absolutes.  
While those northerners dedicated to moral progress praised themselves as “Reformers 
harnessed for the moral war,”58 Democrats derided groups such as abolitionists as “snuffy 
old women,” “lank-jawed, hungry-eyed men,”59 and “busy-bodies and meddlers.”60  
Senator Daniel S. Dickinson of New York rendered fanaticism itself as a woman, 
                                                                                                                                                 
of James Buchanan, by George B. Loring, of Salem (Boston: Office of the Boston Post, 1856), 3-10; To the 
People of North-Carolina (Raleigh: Office of the North-Carolina Standard, 1856), 1-4. 
 
57Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-
1877 (1990; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 89-91; James Buchanan, “First Annual 
Message, December 8, 1857,” in The Works of James Buchanan, 10:151-54; James Buchanan, 
“Proclamation on the Rebellion in Utah, April 6, 1858,” in The Works of James Buchanan, 10:202-6; 
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199-203.  
 
58Nebraska: A Poem, Personal and Political (Boston: John P. Jewett and Company, 1854), 18. 
 
59S. W. C., “Wisdom and Folly,” The United States Democratic Review, July 1856, 574. 
 
60Loring, A Speech Delivered at Webster, Mass., 6. 
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predicting that “fanaticism, with her loins girt about, and shod with sandals, will, like 
Peter the Hermit” wander into the territories of Kansas and Nebraska.61  Allowing 
another to dictate moral norms paled beside a conservative moral relativism by which 
each white man had the right to worship, drink, and own slaves as he saw fit.  Horatio 
Seymour aptly summarized, “The principle of local and distributed jurisdiction, not only 
makes good government, but it also makes good manhood.”62 
As the legislative manifestation of Democratic conservatism, popular sovereignty 
would, Democrats explained, reinforce manhood and bulwark the prerogatives of all 
household heads.  Dickinson, who first proposed popular sovereignty in Congress, 
boasted that the policy represented faith in “the capacity of man for his own 
government.”  He added that if political leaders deem an individual man “incapable of 
discharging this duty himself, [than] he should not be intrusted with the destiny of 
others.”  In other words, doubting the efficacy of popular sovereignty amounted to 
distrust of American men’s individual autonomy.  Stephen A. Douglas suggested that 
succumbing to “congressional dictation” in the territories was “degrading,” while Cass 
lamented that “pseudo reformers are entering our domestic circles, and striving to break 
up our family organizations.”  Samuel Tilden of New York, demonstrating that popular 
sovereignty did not only apply to the territories, argued against a temperance law in his 
                                                 
61Daniel S. Dickinson, “Speech Delivered at Delhi, Delaware County, N. Y., at a Meeting of the 
‘Hardshell’ or National Democracy of the County, September 29, 1854,” in Speeches, Correspondence, 
Etc., of the Late Daniel S. Dickinson, 1:494. 
 
62Speech of the Hon. Horatio Seymour, 2.  Historian John Stauffer describes how New England writers 
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began to eschew sentimentality because “Moral certainty was also gendered: it meant an adherence to 
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state, claiming that such legislation “invades the rightful domain of the individual 
judgment and conscience, and takes a step backward toward that barbarian age when the 
wages of labor, the prices of commodities, a man’s food and clothing, were dictated to 
him by a government calling itself paternal.”63  Presumably, Democrats had no qualms 
with paternalism, provided its subjects were African American and white female 
dependents.  When paternalism encroached on a white man’s self-determination, on the 
other hand, it threatened emasculation.  Democrats stressed their dedication to preserving 
the integrity of all white households; yet, as would become evident, southern masters 
received the most consideration.  
 
Despite assurances that popular sovereignty treated all families impartially, 
dependency on popular sovereignty left northern Democrats susceptible to the same 
accusations of unmasculine, Doughface treason as in 1820.  Theoretical inconsistencies 
wracked popular sovereignty, producing a resultant bias in favor of southern households.  
The theoretical poverty of popular sovereignty provided its malleability, yet poisoned the 
Democrats that attempted to use it by exposing them as tools of the South.  The most 
obvious flaw was the uncertainty as to whether a territorial legislature could outlaw 
slavery during the territorial phase or whether only a constitutional convention could 
prohibit slavery when actually applying for statehood.  Northerners favored the former as 
settlers could prohibit slavery soon after a territory’s organization.  Southerners, 
                                                 
63Daniel S. Dickinson, “Speech on the Acquisition of Territory, and the Formation of Governments for the 
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meanwhile, preferred the latter schedule, which would permit slavery to gain a foothold 
in a territory, thereby increasing the likelihood that it would come into the Union as a 
slave state.  Janus-faced, the Democracy appealed to the sections differently to win 
elections, profiting from what David M. Potter labeled “a proposal possessing all the 
charms of ambiguity.”64   
Due to a deeper theoretical impurity, moreover, the dispute between the southern 
and northern interpretations was to some extent an academic debate.  Democrats 
proclaimed that popular sovereignty allowed individuals to determine their own 
“domestic relations.”  This absolute autonomy functioned only so long as a referendum 
never occurred, for when one side lost, it would have to yield to the dictates of others.  
James Buchanan, referencing the idea at the heart of popular sovereignty, admonished, 
“Without a cheerful submission to the will of the majority no democratic government can 
exist.”65  Yet “cheerful submission” would inherently deprive some citizens of masculine 
independence and self-determination.  Popular sovereignty placated dueling moralities 
and conceptions of domesticity only so long as a vote never took place.  As one critical 
congressman tartly observed, “Well, it seems that you have got the Kansas-Nebraska bill 
passed; and the doctrine is […] a sort of panacea to be applied to heal all divisions and all 
diversity of feeling in this great Union.”  Pointing to the rampant violence in Kansas 
between free-soil and proslavery settlers, he mocked the presumption of this severely 
flawed principle.66   
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Many antislavery northerners maintained that the mere presence of slavery, 
because it degraded free labor and debauched morals, automatically closed the territories 
to northern families.  Peaceful coexistence between proslavery and antislavery families 
was, therefore, impossible.  The doctrine’s effectiveness required an unrealistic 
suspension of moral judgment so that antagonistic family types could interact in what 
approximated an amoral state of nature.  This theoretical equilibrium broke down in 
violence long before Kansas was ready for statehood.  Congressman Joshua R. Giddings 
explained that the very passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act amounted to Congressional 
approval of slavery in the territories and would “exclude free men from it; for, as I have 
said, free laborers, bred up with feelings of self-respect, cannot, and will not, mingle with 
slaves.”67  One anti-Cass pamphlet similarly warned that northern families would not 
emigrate because “They will not expose their children and their children’s children to 
such deplorable contingencies.”68  Slaveholders were also wary about relocating if 
slavery could eventually be outlawed.  Yet, many non-slaveholding southerners did move 
to Kansas as a vanguard, even though the enslaved population never numbered much 
more than two hundred.  Slaveholders could make Kansas a slave state without risking 
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the loss of their slaves, while free-soilers perceived inherent barriers to settling Kansas, 
revealing the latent prosouthernism of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.69   
As if these theoretical flaws were not enough, Doughfaces exposed themselves to 
charges of treason with overt declarations that popular sovereignty was preservative of 
southern mastery.  In his original articulation of the idea, Cass explained, “For, if the 
relation of master and servant may be regulated or annihilated by its [Congress’s] 
legislation, so may the relation of husband and wife, of parent and child, and of any other 
condition which our institutions and the habits of our society recognize.”  Recoiling at 
this eventuality, he queried, “What would be thought if Congress should undertake to 
prescribe the terms of marriage in New York, or to regulate the authority of parents over 
their children in Pennsylvania?”70  Although he suggested that popular sovereignty 
guaranteed the inviolability of all homes nationwide, Cass illustrated that the primary 
concern was to safeguard the specific relations of dependency—those of “master and 
servant”—that composed the plantation household and forged southern mastery.  He 
thereby reassured southerners that his doctrine would keep an encroaching and paternal 
federal government from interfering with their own paternalism at home. 
Faced with such blatant appeals to southern mastery, antislavery northerners cried 
treason.  One northerner complained that southerners rejected all attempts to limit slavery 
“as an invasion of their domestic hearths, as fraught with insurrection, [and] massacre to 
themselves.”  Unfortunately, northerners such as Cass echoed this refrain when they 
catered to southern demands, an action which betrayed their own domestic values as 
these Doughfaces had been “born and trained at firesides where slavery was ever 
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regarded as a criminal violation of natural rights, a severe moral and political evil.”71  
Antislavery northerners denounced the “northern doughface[s] with a cotton heart” and 
deployed familiar gendered slurs, attacking Stephen A. Douglas, the “Little Giant” 
himself, because, lacking “the stature of a full-grown man / […] / this Tom Thumb Titan 
is not seen / Save when he climbs upon a negro’s back.”72  Such unmasculine traitors as 
Douglas numbered among slaveholders’ dependents, as they required southern patronage 
to appear politically full-grown.  The servile, effeminate, unrepublican, and traitorous 
reputation Doughfaces earned in 1820 clearly endured. 
 Doughfaces created a distinct niche for themselves in the late 1840s and 1850s by 
transgressing sectional boundaries of domesticity to placate southern anxieties with 
popular sovereignty.  In doing so, however, they betrayed the northern household.  
Mocking northerners so enamored of the South that they aspired to planter status 
themselves, a critical poem implicated Doughface masculinity: 
The native southron is a nobleman 
Contrasted with the turncoat of the north,  
………………………………………….. 
He has not southern hospitality, 
………………………………... 
And he has not the southern chivalry, 
Which cowards dread and gallant men admire.73 
 
Excoriated by antislavery northerners, Doughfaces were simultaneously not manly 
enough to conform to southern domestic conventions.  In the short-term, this liminal 
                                                 
71Jarvis, Facts and Arguments against the Election of General Cass, 3.   
 
72Nebraska: A Poem, 22, 12.  
 
73Ibid., 41. 
 
 34
position provided Doughfaces with political capital.  Nonetheless, rejection by the North 
and inability to sufficiently satisfy the South would eventually leave them homeless. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
DOUGHFACES TRIUMPHANT: THE 1856 BUCHANAN CAMPAIGN 
 
I am not a man, but a President—a democratic President. 
 
—Leaven for Doughfaces, 1856 
Stressing that James Buchanan, the 1856 Democratic presidential candidate, was 
devoted to treating all Americans fairly, one campaign document informed Pennsylvania 
voters that “Whenever he emerged from his quiet home, it was to demand the recognition 
of all the guarantees of the Constitution to all the States.”74  Buchanan and his fellow 
presidential aspirants endured scrutiny not only of their public record, but also of the type 
of home from which they “emerged” into the political arena, as observers judged the 
candidates’ political legitimacy based upon their domestic lives.  Democrats had to work 
especially hard as their man, in addition to being “the consummate ‘doughface,’” 75 was 
also a bachelor, a liability for any politician.  Because of his marital status, which both 
supporters and opponents seized upon, Buchanan’s candidacy constitutes an exceptional 
example of how the politics of household functioned.  The Democrat’s lack of a 
normative family led many to dwell on the type of “quiet home” Buchanan hailed from in 
order to predict the type of home, northern or southern, he would favor as president.   
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 James Buchanan of Pennsylvania led his party to victory in 1856 over John C. 
Frémont, candidate of the exclusively northern Republican party, and Millard Fillmore, 
the nominee of the Know-Nothing party, which counted its main support in the Upper 
South.  Fillmore also had the backing of a rump convention of Whigs, who were defunct 
as a nationally competitive organization.  The Republican and Know-Nothing parties 
made their presidential election debuts in 1856, and neither the Whigs nor the Know-
Nothings would survive the campaign.76  This transitional election therefore marked the 
end of the second American party system, which had pitted Whigs against Democrats 
since the 1830s, as well as the commencement of a new two-party system matching 
Democrats against Republicans.   
A particularly noteworthy aspect of this campaign was the politicization of the 
candidates’ marital status and family life.  Reporting on rumors such as those surrounding 
Buchanan’s “celibacy” and Frémont’s elopement, the New York Herald lamented, “What 
has all this to do with the capacity, public services and real eminence of our distinguished 
men?”  The paper answered its own question when it observed that electioneers sought 
“some advantages of a domestic character—in this struggle to get into the White 
House.”77  In 1856 discussion of the candidates’ domestic lives intersected with 
campaign concerns.  Amidst the charged anti-Catholicism of the Know-Nothing 
campaign, for example, Frémont’s suspected marriage by a Catholic priest as well as the 
alleged Catholic ancestry of Fillmore’s deceased wife represented more than entertaining 
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speculations.78  Indeed, the Herald, which endorsed Frémont, soon abandoned its 
principled course and assailed Buchanan’s bachelorhood.79  In a political culture 
premised on competing conceptions of the household and in which a political actor’s 
domestic relations determined his political viability, it followed that Buchanan, 
seemingly without a household, elicited the most scrutiny.  
As the only bachelor to serve as president in American history, Buchanan 
required a more creative defense than that which sufficed for Doughfaces in the past.  
Critics could paint him as a traitor to more than just the northern family—they also 
accused him of treason against American families and manhood more generally.  In 
marked contrast to steady advancement in his public career—serving as Pennsylvania 
legislator, Unites States representative and senator, secretary of state, and minister to 
Russia and to the Court of St. James—Buchanan’s heterosexual romantic life stalled 
early.  He became engaged in 1819 at age twenty-eight to Ann Coleman, who died 
possibly from suicide, before they married.80  Buchanan clung to the traumatic loss of his 
betrothed as the reason for his self-enforced bachelorhood.   
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At the same time, Buchanan may have been involved in a relationship even more 
unspeakable, not the least because antebellum Americans did not have an appropriate 
vocabulary with which to describe it.81  Buchanan enjoyed a close, lifetime friendship 
with Alabama senator and fellow bachelor William R. King who died in 1853 while 
serving as vice president under Franklin Pierce.  Building on contemporary gossip, such 
as one congressman’s reference to the two men as “Buchanan & his wife,” and surviving 
circumstantial evidence, imaginative historians have filled in the gaps, elaborating a 
possible romantic and sexual relationship between the two Democrats.82  Whether or not 
their bond transcended friendship, the intimacy between the two men did not escape the 
notice of contemporaries.83  
Even without such speculation, bachelorhood itself represented a profound 
transgression against both American political culture, in which domesticity and 
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statesmanship mutually reinforced one another, and, more specifically, against southern 
constructions of mastery.  Nancy Cott finds that in the late nineteenth century marriage 
conferred male citizenship.  As the state defined marriage, deviation from accepted 
practices amounted to treason.  Additionally, in a southern context, manhood defined as 
mastery assumed marriage and control of household dependents as prerequisites.  
Buchanan—unmarried, childless, and slaveless—seemed to strike out on all counts.  
Adding one more barrier to Buchanan’s candidacy, the Democracy prided itself as the 
most masculine party and indeed was less open than was the Whig party to female 
participation.  While bachelorhood certainly bore an unmasculine stigma, the more 
serious transgression was not the lack of virility but the absence of household mastery, as, 
in the politics of household, political legitimacy began at home.84  
As Democrats struggled to portray their seemingly unmasculine candidate as 
another hero in the vein of Andrew Jackson, Buchanan’s bachelorhood did present them 
with an opportunity to bind him more closely to the principle of popular sovereignty and 
to depict him as the national candidate.  Buchanan’s potential ability to rise above all 
households whether northern or southern, because he did not head a normative family of 
his own, allowed Democrats to craft an image of him as the ideal moderator of sectional 
passions, moral visions, and contrasting conceptions of the family—a true reflection of 
the amoral refereeing to which popular sovereignty aspired.  As an accurate embodiment 
of that doctrine, however, Buchanan was also offered to southern audiences as 
prosouthern.  This selective presentation, as well as antislavery opponents’ contention 
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that Buchanan’s lack of a family left him unable to understand the distinct needs of 
northern households, consequently exposed him to charges of Doughface treason. 
 
Democrats heralded Buchanan as the ideal national candidate capable of placating 
their bisectional party and the nation it supposedly represented in two ways.  First, 
campaigners equated him with popular sovereignty, because he stood on a platform that 
included that doctrine.  Democrats repeatedly emphasized that the “spirit of the 
Democratic party resides in its principles more than in its men.”85  Jean H. Baker notes 
that antebellum politicians understood platforms as a tool with which to differentiate 
political parties in a metaphorical sense—platforms functioned as “a special place for 
Democrats to stand during the campaign.”86  Democrats employed such language as they 
debated the plank-by-plank construction of a platform and which candidate should mount 
it.  As popular sovereignty was a doctrine that could supposedly balance sectional 
interests, Howell Cobb could declare, “The platform we stand upon is as broad as the 
Union and as national as the constitution, and invites to its defence patriots of all parties 
and all sections.”87  Democrats celebrated their “Cincinnati platform,” so named because 
the party’s 1856 national convention held in that city crafted it, as a large enough stage 
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upon which the whole nation could unite.88  With core principles enshrined in the 
platform, the candidate who stood upon it became the physical manifestation of those 
ideals; thus, Buchanan, similarly, was obviously a “man upon whom all can unite.”89 
 Republicans and Know-Nothings also testified to Buchanan’s identification with 
popular sovereignty through their criticism of him as weak and overly dependent upon 
the Cincinnati platform.  It appeared to many as if Buchanan had “renounce[d] his 
Identity” in professing his dedication to the platform.90  Know-Nothing supporter Charles 
B. Calvert of Maryland commented that Millard Fillmore’s “manly independence, in 
qualifying his acceptance of the American [Know-Nothing] platform, stands out in bold 
relief, when contrasted with the subserviency of the acceptance of his competitor.”91  
Detractors went further than simply noting that Buchanan had subsumed himself into a 
certain platform; they attacked him for his specific association with the repugnant 
doctrine of popular sovereignty.  One campaign song presented the issue presciently, if 
crudely, by having Buchanan declare: 
The South “demands more room”—the West and North 
 must bow, 
And the East must knuckle down—and the Niggers hold the plow, 
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  For “Platform” James am I.92 
 
Critics who attacked Buchanan did so with familiar insinuations of unmasculine 
subserviency to the South—in this case dependency upon a prosouthern platform.   
Despite Democratic claims to honor principles over men, Buchanan was not a 
mere cipher.93  He brought distinct advantages as a candidate once supporters stumbled 
upon a way to overcome the potential handicap of his marital status by boldly branding 
him a superior statesman due to his bachelorhood—the second means by which 
Democrats offered Buchanan as the lone national candidate.  As they explained it, a 
bachelor seemed predisposed to standing on such an inclusive platform as that of popular 
sovereignty.  Immediately after Buchanan’s nomination, Pennsylvanian Samuel W. Black 
rose to convey his state’s appreciation to the Democratic national convention and also to 
assuage any remaining anxieties.  In what would become a theme of the campaign, Black 
told the raucous crowd: 
Now let me set Mr. Buchanan right on the matrimonial question (hurra! hurra for 
old Buch!)  Though our beloved chieftain has not, in his own person, exactly 
(laughter) fulfilled (renewed laughter) the duties that every man owes to the sex, 
and to society, there is a reason.  Ever since James Buchanan was a marrying 
man, he has been wedded to THE CONSTITUTION, and in Pennsylvania we do 
not allow bigamy.  (The Convention flings its hats to the ceiling.)94 
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This remarkable utterance demonstrates one way in which Democrats sought to alleviate 
fears over Buchanan’s manhood.  Buchanan was not guilty of treason in not fulfilling the 
“duties” of a man; rather, he practiced a higher form of statesmanship.  Black translated 
bachelorhood into a sort of monastic abstention from a more worldly union of flesh that 
could only distract less pure statesmen from their mission.  In this rendering, 
bachelorhood in private life paralleled the amoral neutrality of Democratic conservatism, 
as both promised an unbiased orientation.     
 While Black contended that bachelorhood enhanced statesmanship, one 
pamphleteer located the same benefit in childlessness.  Lacking his own progeny, the 
nation was Buchanan’s charge.  The author asserted that “Like Washington, Madison, 
and Jackson, Mr. Buchanan is childless.  God has denied these benefactors children, ‘that 
a nation might call them father.’”  By filling the role of the stern and impartial 
father/statesman, Buchanan could calm the territories, the site of active contestation 
under the parameters popular sovereignty.  Like a good father, Buchanan would “separate 
these angry foes, not by ideal lines and unequal privileges, but by giving the right to each 
to enter upon and occupy ample and abundant territory.”95  The interests of both 
antislavery and plantation households would rest secure under Buchanan’s paternal gaze. 
 Especially when targeting northerners, Democrats presented Buchanan, long 
plagued by charges of Doughfacism, as an unprejudiced umpire of sectional animosities.  
One piece of campaign literature addressed specifically to Buchanan’s fellow 
Pennsylvanians praised him, equipped as he was with “the moderate and unsectional 
feeling of a Pennsylvanian,” for his ability to mediate between “peaceful citizens from 
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the North and from the South, from a distance and from near at hand, who come to settle 
in good faith.”  Even though he accorded equal consideration to the South, his election 
would prevent the entrance of more slave states.96  Treating the South fairly need not 
imply treason but rather suggested manly independence; as such, his past actions in 
defense of southern rights evinced “firmness only too rare in those days among Northern 
men.” The ability to straddle this sectional divide was, like Democrats’ conservatism, a 
testament to manhood.97   
 Buchanan himself postured as a wise old sage capable of managing bickering 
children.  Accepting the Democratic nomination, he advised, “Let the members of the 
family abstain from intermeddling with the exclusive domestic concerns of each other.”98  
Although he struck the pose of an unbiased arbitrator, Buchanan often revealed that he 
did in fact favor the South, as he repeatedly blamed the North for inciting the slave states.  
Taking a tone which would have smacked of rank condescension to antislavery 
northerners, Buchanan lectured in his victory speech, “all we of the North have to do is to 
permit our Southern neighbors to manage their own domestic affairs, as they permit us to 
manage ours.  It is merely to adopt the golden rule, and do unto them as we would they 
should do unto us, in the like circumstances.”99  The Democratic nominee, like the 
doctrine at the heart of the platform on which he perched, clearly played favorites.   
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Mirroring the prosouthern reality of the supposedly neutral Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
Democrats, when appealing to southerners, stressed that Buchanan would aggressively 
promote the interests of their families.  Despite lacking the private prerequisites of 
marriage and mastery over household dependents which defined manhood in the South, 
Buchanan’s supporters publicly performed his masculinity.  By rhetorically constructing 
Buchanan as a southern paternalist, Democrats illustrated that the distinction between 
privately achieved mastery and publicly mediated constructions of masculine honor was 
not absolute.  The public, performative dimension of manhood in the antebellum South 
allowed for seemingly aberrant men such as bachelors to lay claim to mastery and to 
interact as equals with other men in the political arena. 
To prove that Buchanan would act as any good southern head of household 
would, Democrats paraded Buchanan’s lifelong defense of southern domesticity.  
Reaching all the way back to the Congressional debates over the reception of abolitionist 
petitions in 1836, Democrats asserted, truthfully, that Buchanan had consistently 
defended white southern families.  Arguing that Congress should not entertain antislavery 
petitions lest they incite slaves, Buchanan had originally proclaimed, “Touch this 
question of slavery seriously—let it once be made manifest to the people of the south that 
they cannot live with us, except in a state of continual apprehension and alarm for their 
wives and their children, for all that is near and dear to them upon the earth,—and the 
Union is from that moment dissolved.”  The North, Buchanan stressed, did not have near 
as much at stake in debates over slavery, “a question brought home to the fireside, to the 
domestic circle, of every white man in the southern States.”100  Statements such as this, 
recapitulated nearly verbatim, amounted to motifs in Buchanan’s public speeches for the 
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rest of his career.  Twenty years later, upon his electoral victory, for instance, Buchanan 
rebuked the North: “With the South it is a question of self-preservation, of personal 
security around the family altar, of life or of death.”101  With so much at stake, how could 
patriotic northerners not yield to southern demands? 
 Southerners seized upon their candidate’s lengthy record of prosouthernism and 
reprinted his ancient addresses.102  Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia, referencing the 
notorious slave uprising in his own state, declared, “When the issue of incendiary 
publications arose, he [Buchanan] voted to violate the very mails rather than permit the 
agitators of a Nat Turner insurrection to light the fires of incendiarism.”103  Democrats 
reminded wary planters that Millard Fillmore, in contrast, had voted for Congress to 
accept abolitionist petitions,104 while John C. Frémont allied himself with “fanatics” such 
as Joshua R. Giddings who actually invited “servile insurrection.”105  Southern 
Democrats could satisfactorily conclude that, unlike both antislavery northerners and the 
many southerners who chose not to back Buchanan, the Democratic nominee knew “the 
consequences of abolition” as well as any paranoid plantation owner.106   
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 Buchanan appeared similar to planters in more than his preoccupation with slave 
uprisings when Democrats rhetorically styled him a patriarch akin to southern masters.  
His campaign biography presented him as a country squire, reposing at his “Wheatland” 
estate near Lancaster, Pennsylvania.107  A true “benefactor,” Buchanan elicited praise for 
protecting female dependents such as elderly widows.108  One newspaper countered 
assertions that Buchanan “has no sympathy or regard for the [female] sex” by stating that 
his establishment of a fund to purchase “fuel for indigent females” in his hometown 
ensured that “Many a desolate hearth has been made glad by his noble charity, and many 
more will hereafter reap its benefits.”109  Not only did Buchanan, without his own 
normative family, still manage to protect women in other households, he also defended 
traditional gender roles more broadly.  Registering disapproval over “abolition females” 
who took on public roles in the Frémont campaign, one Texas newspaper applauded 
“how much more like women the Buchanan and Fillmore ladies behave than their 
opponents.”110  Supporters described the portly, white-haired, sixty-five-year-old 
guardian of female modesty as “muscular,” “in the vigor of health, intellectually and 
physically,” and, amazingly, as “a man of Herculean labor.”111  Despite the stereotype of 
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the “cold blooded, imperturbable and selfish old bachelor,”112 Buchanan was actually 
quite personable and noted for his hospitality.113  Henry A. Wise, in another example of 
the positive appropriation of bachelorhood, went so far as to posit that Buchanan’s 
vitality resulted from his sexual abstinence, claiming, “a man of sound morals, he has 
conserved himself” so that in this national crisis he could be “called upon at the right 
time, for his conservatisms.”114 
 With these assertions, southerners and national campaign literature directed at 
southerners contradicted the image of Buchanan as an impartial candidate who would 
ensure that all parts of the Union received equal treatment.  Southerners noted that “he 
has stood in the breach, and fought in defence of the constitutional rights of the South 
against fanaticism in all its forms.”  In contrast, they attacked Fillmore for his “state of 
executive neutrality” by maintaining that he would not use the veto power to 
preferentially favor the South.  Southerners even adopted the concept of Doughfacism 
itself, declaring that the South had its own Doughfaces—those who would please the 
North by betraying the slave states.  Loyal southerners would, on the other hand, vote for 
the candidate who promised additional territory for slavery.  In 1856 this candidate was, 
ironically, a Yankee bachelor.115  Mississippi’s Albert Gallatin Brown took the argument 
to its ridiculous extreme, hyperbolically praising Buchanan’s prosouthernism by 
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declaring, “In my judgment he is as worthy of Southern confidence and Southern votes as 
Mr. Calhoun ever was.”116   
 
Faced with such deliberate attempts to offer Buchanan to southern voters as one 
of their own, opponents did not have to work hard to denounce him for Doughface 
treason.  Yet they did more than just cite Democrats’ own prosouthern appeals.  They too 
focused on Buchanan’s bachelorhood by claiming that his lack of a conventional 
household prevented him from being able to empathize with the plight of white northern 
families.  Some Republicans contented themselves with mocking Buchanan as unmanly 
for having never married, and campaign literature was rife with stereotypical depictions 
of either the lascivious bachelor untempered by feminine influence or the effeminate 
bachelor obviously suffering from “a lack of some essential quality.”  Denunciations of 
Buchanan’s bachelorhood, both flippant and vicious, nonetheless represented more than 
crude innuendo and often contained serious messages about the political ramifications of 
the sectionalized nature of domesticity.117 
For many critics Buchanan’s lack of a spouse not only cast doubt upon his 
manhood but also on his statesmanship—his very legitimacy as a political actor.  A 
pseudonymous correspondent to the New York Evening Post made this point clear.  “An 
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Ex-Old Maid” declared that “an Old Bachelor is at most but a half man.”  As if this did 
not constitute reason enough to oppose Buchanan, the writer then queried, “and how can 
such a person make more than a half-President?”118  Even women barred from voting 
appeared to possess greater political viability than Buchanan.  Republicans, both female 
and male, boasting that “WE’LL GIVE ’EM JESSIE!” practically turned Jessie Benton 
Frémont, the wife of the Republican nominee, into a candidate herself.  To many 
supporters she seemed more worthy of occupying the White House than the Democratic 
bachelor.119 
While the absence of manly attributes certainly implicated Buchanan’s 
statesmanship, his perceived inability to head a household most undermined his 
legitimacy in the eyes of critics.  Republicans questioned the bachelor’s ability to 
understand and defend white northern households.  The fact that Buchanan never entered 
into a marital union led many to ask whether he could ever administer evenhandedly the 
analogous Union of North and South.  One campaign song creatively juxtaposed the 
Democratic bachelor with the Republican couple of John C. Frémont as the 
representative of the North and Jessie Benton Frémont as a daughter of the South: 
The “White House” has no place 
    That a bachelor can grace, 
 So with “Jessie” we’ll adorn it anew! […] 
“Fremont and Jessie” will be faithful; 
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“Union”—“of hearts” be their sway, 
’Tween the sunny, balmy South, 
And the steadfast, busy North, 
The dawn of FREEDOM’S GLORIOUS DAY!120 
 
By conflating marriage between a northerner and a southerner with the Union more 
broadly, antislavery northerners implied that the solitary Democrat could not preside 
without prejudice over both sections.  One Republican speaker, after denouncing 
Doughfaces as those “who desecrate the soil on which they were born,” made a similar 
linkage between bachelorhood and Doughfacism, telling a mass meeting in New York 
City, “No wonder this man [Buchanan] is a sectionalist.  He was never for union in all his 
life.”121 
Continuing the theme taken up in the 1820 debates over Missouri, Republicans 
once again articulated that northern and southern families constituted distinct households 
and that Doughfaces, in catering to those of the South, betrayed northern homes.  A 
speaker warned a gathering of German-American Republicans in Philadelphia that the 
Democracy’s proslavery stance threatened their families in the territories.  Adding an 
element unique to the campaign rhetoric of 1856, he cast Buchanan’s bachelorhood and 
consequent inability to empathize with antislavery families in terms of Doughface 
treason.  He warned an enthusiastic crowd, “Truly, the politicians who propose to the 
Germans, or to any other class of people, having families to provide for, to vote the 
Cincinnati platform, must think them insane.”  He continued, “It may be all very well for 
an old bachelor [applause and laughter] in easy circumstances, who has no posterity to 
take care of, to stand on that platform,” while “we, for our part, have not the heart in us to 
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take their [our children’s] future bread out of their mouths, to give it to a few great 
gentlemen, who live quite comfortably without it, on the labor of their slaves.”122  As in 
1820 and in 1854, antislavery northerners, by accusing Doughfaces of treason, pointed to 
the existence of divergent domesticities.  In 1856, their charges possessed additional 
salience, coupled as they were with denunciations of a Doughface who appeared even 
more predisposed to committing treason against the northern home because, as a “dried 
up old bachelor,”123 he rejected the very concept of household. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The fault in southern statesmanship has been that we have thrown the burden of 
the battle for Southern rights upon our allies at the North, and then have 
acquiesced in the inevitable result—their defeat and destruction.  Northern 
sentiment must and will overwhelm any men or any party at the North, placed in 
the attitude of fighting simply for the opinions and interests (and may be rights) of 
another section, against Northern views and Northern interests.  We cannot expect 
men at the North, however well disposed, to lead a forlorn hope on such terms of 
disadvantage.  The South herself must fight the fight. 
—Charleston Mercury, April 25, 1860 
Despite Buchanan’s hopeful prediction in his inaugural address that with his 
election “the people proclaimed their will, [and] the tempest at once subsided, and all was 
calm,”124 his administration unfolded as an extended commentary on the corrosive 
potential of popular sovereignty.  Emboldened by the United States Supreme Court’s 
1857 Dred Scott decision, in which the Court suggested that a territorial legislature could 
not prohibit slavery, southerners definitively scrapped the northern interpretation of 
popular sovereignty in favor of positive protection for their “domestic institution” in the 
territories.  Buchanan himself undermined the supposed neutrality of popular sovereignty 
and compounded sectional animosity by trying to force through Congress a proslavery 
and blatantly fraudulent state constitution for Kansas.  Taken together, the Court’s ruling 
and Buchanan’s heavy-handed prosouthern policies alienated many northern Democrats.  
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 A newly resolute northern Democracy, aware that the North would no longer 
tolerate such rank prosouthernism, rallied behind Stephen A. Douglas who still clung to 
the northern interpretation of popular sovereignty—that a territorial legislature could ban 
slavery.125  Southerners, following the lead of hard-liners such as William Lowndes 
Yancey, repudiated Cass’s original idea of Congressional non-interference in the 
territories by demanding the inclusion of Congressional protection of territorial slavery in 
the Democracy’s 1860 platform.  In the midst of his party’s disintegration, Buchanan and 
the Doughface alternative he represented seemed largely irrelevant.  Where once 
Democrats lauded popular sovereignty as a masculine exercise of masterly prerogative, 
Yancey now cast it aside as an “effete doctrine.”126  This impasse had always been 
implicit within popular sovereignty.  The charged politics of the late 1850s brought the 
divisions into the open at the Charleston convention in 1860 when the party fractured.  
 In the end, Doughfaces and popular sovereignty required too much of northern 
families.  Claiming that meddling northerners who understood slavery only as an abstract 
issue endangered the sanctity of the southern household, Doughfaces always demanded 
that the North yield.  In his inaugural address, Buchanan, true to form, chided his fellow 
northerners, “this question of domestic slavery is of far graver importance than any mere 
political question, because, should the agitation continue, it may eventually endanger the 
personal safety of a large portion of our countrymen where the institution exists,” leading 
inevitably to the “loss of peace and domestic security around the family altar.”127   
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 Doughfaces placed the burden of southern familial security on northerners, giving 
little thought to the distinct needs of northern families, even those of fellow Democrats.  
One Democratic periodical boasted, “In this spectacle of moral and political grandeur, the 
Northern Democracy stands preeminently conspicuous—theirs is exclusively a contest of 
principle.”128  Northern Democratic families, not facing such dramatic threats to their 
domestic inviolability as slave uprisings, were expected to be completely selfless.  Yet 
these households obviously had concerns about their own material well-being.  
Assurances that they fought for a principle of equality that in reality advantaged the 
South could hardly have consoled them.   Northern families knew they had more at stake 
than a principle from which they derived no benefit—they had their own future economic 
and domestic happiness, the realization of which proved incompatible with slavery. 
 Doughfaces postured as impartial sectional mediators, and, for a time, they did 
superficially bridge disagreements between the North and South, although their 
maneuvering increased sectional obstinacy in the long-term.  Ever since their appearance 
in 1820, they had to convince skeptical northerners that they were not servile and 
unmasculine trucklers to the Slave Power.  Rather, they argued, their ability to transcend 
their own sectional and domestic interests signified masculine autonomy and a manly 
tolerance for competing conceptions of morality and domesticity.  The Doughface 
doctrine of popular sovereignty and the culminating Doughface candidacy of James 
Buchanan, however, revealed the prosouthern bias of their supposedly masculine 
neutrality.  Doughfaces rhetorically linked their manhood to their purported ability to 
stand aloof from vying interests.  When critics noted the inconsistencies in this position, 
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Doughface manhood consequently suffered.  They could not be the masculine statesmen 
to which they aspired, because they could never achieve true independence.  In coddling 
southern slaveholders, Doughfaces appeared to antislavery northerners as an additional 
link in the vast web of dependency which nourished southern mastery.  By playing the 
dependent in plantation households, Doughfaces committed treason against the northern 
home and emasculated themselves. 
Republicans, in contrast, promised territories free from slavery for settlement by 
northern families.  They also held out the prospect of homesteads to eager emigrants and 
the industrial development of the West.  Doughfaces offered an alleged equality in the 
territories that would actually exclude antislavery families that could not stomach mixing 
with the economic degradation and moral pollution of slavery.  Ultimately, Democrats 
and Republicans and, more broadly, “conservatives” and “fanatics” differed as to the 
appropriate political response to the presence of evil in society and, more specifically, 
within the household.  Democrats urged tolerance, while Republicans demanded 
extirpation and proscription, even of the families which housed the evil.   
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